A language model on its own can only talk. It becomes powerful — and dangerous — the moment you connect it to tools: a database query, a payment API, a file system, a shell. MCP (the Model Context Protocol) is the standard that makes those connections easy. Which means your real AI attack surface isn't the model. It's the catalog of tools your agents can call.
The problem: an unmapped, high-privilege attack surface
An agent with a run_shell or delete_records tool is a breach waiting to happen — and most enterprises have no list of which agents hold which tools, who exposed them, or how risky they are. MCP servers spin up across teams, each exposing its own tools, with no central catalog and no approval gate. It's the npm-install problem, except the packages can move money.
Why it matters to the enterprise
You already gate what software runs in production. AI tools deserve the same discipline. A registry lets Security reason about blast radius — "which agents can reach the payments tool?" — and enforce sane defaults like "no shell tools in production." Without it, every new MCP server quietly expands what your AI can do, with no one signing off.
The model decides what to do. The tools decide what's possible. Govern the tools and you've drawn the boundary of your AI's power.
How AuthSpoke does it
- MCP Registry — every MCP server as a governed resource: owner, exposed tools, trust level, classification, approval and health.
- Tool Catalog — each tool an agent can invoke, with its type (function, API, retrieval, code-exec, shell, browser), owner, the agent or MCP that exposes it, risk level and usage volume.
- Approve or block centrally — promote safe tools, block dangerous ones; the decision is recorded for audit.
- Relationship-aware — see the chain from tool → MCP server → agent → data, so "this AI can reach payroll" is obvious at a glance.
AuthSpoke treats MCP as a first-class citizen. As MCP becomes the default way agents reach enterprise systems, the registry becomes the catalog of your AI infrastructure — and the place you draw the line.
What you get
- One catalog of MCP servers & tools
- Per-tool risk, owner & usage
- Central approve / block
- Block shell & high-risk tools in prod
- Tool → MCP → agent → data lineage
- A defined, defensible attack surface
Know exactly what your agents can call
Register your MCP servers and tools, set approvals, and turn an unmapped attack surface into a governed catalog.